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dans un deuxiiime temps sur l'allocation des stocks, sur les pourcentages de
ptche . attribuer 1 chacun des pays et, surtout, sur la question des frontiares
maritimes que nous allons aborder ces jours prochains. Je suis professionnelle-
ment et personnellement Porte A l'optimisme. J'espare que nous allons rdussir
darn le temps qui nous a ete attribue. Si nous r~ussissons, lors des prochains
congres nous pourrons parler d'un nouveau d~veloppement pour ce qui est du
raglement arbitral ou judiciaire de diffbrends entre le Canada-et les Etats-
Unis dans un domaine qui, jusqu'A maintenant, je crois, a &6 reserv6 aux
m6canismes politiques.
Je sais que vous 6tes A court de temps. Je pense que j'ai soulene quelques
points qui me semblent essentiels. J'aurai peut-etre l'occasion, au cours des
debats subsequents, d'intervenir de nouveau.
Monroe Leigh
I would like to disavow, at the very beginning, the notion that my com-
ments will be launched from an American perspective. I recognize that the
program makers, for legitimate reasons, had billed Professor Baxter as speak-
ing from an American perspective, and Dean Macdonald as speaking from a
Canadian perspective. I mention this because it illustrates one of the conclu-
sions I have come to in preparing for this section: in nearly all cases there is
no peculiar Canadian point of view on a matter of principle. Of course, if
you are in a dispute about territory, you are worried about where the line is.
But the principles which have to be applied are not matters of dispute.
This was vividly impressed upon my mind when I was a young lawyer in
Washington in 1948. I was given the assignment of reviewing all of the
dockets of the International Joint Commission from 1909 until that date. Our
firm had been retained in the canal waters dispute between India and
Pakistan, and so I spent a number of weeks in the archives of the United
States. It was a very lonely business going through every docket up until that
time; I think there must have been fifty or sixty. And I was struck by the fact
that in nearly all cases, there was no important nationalistic principle involved,
either on the American side or on the Canadian side. This has led me to
believe that what is really needed in the whole array of dispute settlement
mechanisms is a guarantee of impartiality by the adjudicators who have the
ultimate decision-making responsibility. If the issue cannot be settled by
discussion, then what is needed is simply a guarantee of impartiality on the
part of the ultimate adjudicator. While the International Joint Commission
has done wonderful work in the field of developing the facts in a particular
dispute-and so often the dispute has been settled just from the mere exercise
of bringing out all the facts-nevertheless, it seems that in most of these mat-
ters, thinks would go more rapidly if it were known that there could be a
compulsory adjudication at some point in the future if negotiations fail.
That is one of the principal observations I wish to make about this prob-
lem. I do not know that I would agree entirely with Professor Baxter. His
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paper is very lucid and comprehensive. But I think his sense of tidiness,
which is very great, leads him to suggest sweeping away all of the existing
machinery. I doubt whether that is really worth the trouble it would take in
securing agreement. I would leave most of the machinery in place since much
of it can be used from time to time. But I would like to see some form of
compulsory dispute settlement adopted between the countries in advance.
While it may have to have some limitations, I think it would contribute
greatly toward the momentum of negotiations for a diplomatic settlement
which is to be preferred in all cases.
One of the difficulties in not having a fixed timetable, or some sort of
pressure towards negotiation, is the fact that in our two countries constituen-
cies develop around any particular point of view. We have had this
throughout our national experience together. And once the constituency
develops, the arguments soon tend to be phrased in terms of slogans rather
than in terms of truly acceptable legal principles. We in the United States
have had our share of slogans, of course. "Fifty-four forty or fight" is one of
the most notorious. I had an amusing example of this a year or so ago when I
was involved in discussions with Canadian officials regarding the Gulf of
Maine dispute. Someone sent to me (whether Canadian or American I do not
know, because it came anonymously) a clipping from a Canadian newspaper
which described the twentieth anniversary gathering of a high school class in
your province of New Brunswick. As a part of their celebration, the group
went out and planted a Canadian flag on one of the disputed islands. This
shows the tendency of popular opinion to coalesce around a particular point
of view.
Let me turn to another point which seems to be very important. The
volume of issues developing between the United States and Canada is now
growing -by leaps and bounds. It is extremely difficult for the diplomatic
machinery of the two countries to keep up with it. For example, when
Maurice Copithorne and I were working on the Gulf of Maine dispute, I
found it difficult to schedule times when we could meet to discuss this prob-
lem. From this I conclude that Professor Baxter is correct in that we might
profit from extending the Commission's use in our bilateral relations.
The International Joint Commission has, of course, been an enormous
success in dealing with boundary water problems. We might have commis-
sions in other areas. The United States has set up a great array of commis-
sions with the Soviet Union, various Soviet-bloc countries, and also with
various Middle Eastern countries. The existence of such commissions serves
the purpose of giving an institutionalized priority of attention to problems
that ought to be dealt with before they develop hardened constituencies. Such
constituencies may make it more difficult, politically, to resolve the dispute. I
would venture to say that in the field of antitrust law, a commission which
met periodically between Canadian and American antitrust enforcers would
be a salutary step. I say this because my own limited experience within the
United States government in antitrust matters serves to confirm how difficult
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it is to handle this kind of problem through diplomatic channels. For exam-
ple, one of my dubious successes as Legal Advisor was in persuading the
Department of Justice not to name Canadians as co-conspirators in the
celebrated potash case. It was considered a victory that I got the Justice
Department to agree that the Canadians would be named as "unindicted" co-
conspirators. Well, that was certainly a very modest success.
Let me try and describe to you the bureaucratic situation within the
United States government. You go over to the Justice Department to see, let
us say, the new head of the antitrust division. He has probably never heard of
prior notification arrangements between the State Department and the Justice
Department, so you must first convince him that this is a sound policy. Even
if he knows about it, he may say that we have a new Attorney General who
feels very strongly about these matters so he will have to go and talk to him.
There is nothing that happens automatically to secure the kind of notification
that is needed. In the celebrated Bechtel case, that was very important from
the "-American point of view. The State Department received virtually no
notification of this case which had enormous consequences for our relations in
the Middle East. Instead, it was treated at such a high level that the word
came by telephone on a Wednesday afternoon before Thanksgiving, and the
letter asking for our comments was sent over that afternoon. It was not seen
by anyone on our staff until early Monday morning. By Monday afternoon,
high officials in the Justice Department were already telling the press that the
State Department was delaying their program of bringing suit against
Bechtel. This is the reality of what goes on in bureaucracy. Consequently, I
feel very strongly that we could profit greatly by increasing the number of
joint commissions that are set up for special subjects such as antitrust litiga-
tion.
Let me return to the suggestions that have been offered. As I listened to
Professor Baxter and Dean Macdonald, it seemed to me that there is general
agreement that further steps in the direction of compulsory adjudication are
necessary. I feel very strongly that the threat of compulsory adjudication is
the strongest possible incentive for a rapid movement toward a negotiated set-
tlement. I am especially grateful to Dean Macdonald for pointing out with
such particularity and so much clarity the new possibilities that exist in secur-
ing the adjudicatory mechanism of a panel of the International Court of
Justice, with the assurance that the panel will-be of a composition which is
satisfactory to both the United States and Canada.
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